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EVERY LITTLE THING I DO (INCURS LEGAL
LIABILITY): UNAUTHORIZED USE OF POPULAR MUSIC
IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
I. INTRODUCTION: A COMMON, IF ILLEGAL, PRACTICE
In 1984, Ronald Reagan's re-election campaign used the Bruce
Springsteen song, "Born in the U.S.A.,"' to convey energy and patriotism
to the crowds of Reagan supporters and the ever vigilant media.2 Bruce
Springsteen himself did not approve of or authorize the use of the song.3
Following the Reagan campaign's example, the practice of a political cam-
paign using popular music without authorization has become a feature taken
almost for granted in the contemporary political landscape.
4
This Comment will argue that the common practice of using popular
songs without permission in presidential campaigns is illegal. First, this
Comment surveys recent presidential campaigns' use of popular music,'
summarizes copyright and publicity law and the practices of the entertain-
ment industry,6 and explains the method of analysis used in the Com-
ment.7 Next, the merits of copyright,' publicity right,9 and moral rights
claims,"0 as well as the nature of the remedies sought are explored."
1. BRUcE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A., on BORN IN THE U.S.A. (Columbia Records
1984).
2. "Hey, Baby - You're Playing My Song:" Life on the Campaign Trail, MONTREAL
GAzErrE, Mar. 15, 1992, at A2.
3. See Chet Flippo, The 25 Most Intriguing People of 1984: Bruce Springsteen, PEOPLE,
Dec. 24, 1984 / Dec. 31, 1984, at 28. Reagan began his use of Springsteen by mentioning the
song and praising Springsteen as a "man so many Americans admire" at a campaign rally in New
Jersey.
Bruce [Springsteen] refused to endorse either candidate; he wasn't coy about where
he stood on the issue. In Pittsburgh, two days after President's comments, he said
of Reagan: "I got to wondering what his favorite album must have been. I don't
think he's been listening to this one." And he launched into Johnny 99, a bitter
plaint on the fate of a laid-off worker ....
Ld. Springsteen's was hardly the reaction one would expect of a Reagan supporter.
4. See infra notes 17-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 17-61 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 112-132 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 133-171 and accompanying text.
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Possible defenses against such claims are then discussed, including fair
use,12 statutory exceptions to copyright claims, 3 standing, 4 and the
First Amendment."5 Finally, this Comment concludes by demonstrating
that the unauthorized political use of popular music is illegal, and it briefly
discusses the possibilities of successful legal and equitable action.'
6
H. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The use of music by political campaigns is literally as old as the
Republic itself. Songs and ditties about politicians and political issues can
be traced to the election of 1789,'" and they were used with great wit and
sting in later elections.'" Probably the most famous political song is
12. See infra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 187-191 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 214-228 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 229-247 and accompanying text.
17. A group of women in Trenton, New Jersey, wrote and sang a song to George Washington
during the 1789 election, the first presidential election in the United States:
Virgins fair, and Matrons grave,
Those thy conquering arms did save,
Build for thee triumphal bowers
Strew, ye fair, his way with flowers -
Strew your Hero's way with flowers.
The Gazette of the United States, Apr. 29, 1789, reprinted in MARVIN KrrMAN, THE MAKING OF
THE PREFIDENT [sic] 1789: THE UNAUTHORIED CAMPAIGN BIOGRAPHY 295 (1989).
18. A particularly nasty example comes from the elections of 1796 and 1800. Secretary of
State and later Vice President Thomas Jefferson was dogged with rumors that he had fathered
children by one of his slaves, Sally Hemmings. One song, penned by Jefferson's Federalist
opponents, was sung to the tune of the Revolutionary ditty "Yankee Doodle" (which was itself
written by British loyalists before the American Revolution, to poke fun at colonial agitators):
Of all the damsels on the green
On mountain, or in valley,
A lass so luscious ne'er was seen
As Monticellian Sally.
Yankee Doodle, who's the noodle?
What wife was half so handy?
To breed a flock of slaves for stock
A black amour's the dandy...
When press'd by load of state affairs,
I seek to sport and dally,
The sweetest solace of my cares
Is in the lap of Sally.
HOPE RIDINGS MILL.ER SCANDALS IN THE HIGHEST OFFICE 72-73 (1973), reprinted in ONE-
NIGHT STANDS WITH AMERICAN HISTORY 47-48 (Richard Shenkman & Kurt Reiger, eds. 1982);
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"Happy Days Are Here Again,"'9 used by Franklin Roosevelt and Harry
Truman in their campaigns, which attempted to associate a message of
optimism and enthusiasm with the candidates. Debatably the most
effective political song was used by supporters of William Henry Harrison
to defeat President Martin Van Buren in 1840.21 Harrison's and many
other early campaign songs were specially written for their elections; later
campaigns adopted popular songs as their themes.'
However, President Reagan's use in 1984 of Bruce Springsteen's
"Born in the U.S.A."' was an innovation because it was the first non-
permissive use of a copyrighted song in a presidential campaign.?
Reagan's re-election campaign also made extensive use of a song by
country singer Lee Greenwood, "God Bless the U.S.A.,"'  and played the
see also VARIOus ARTnsTS, Yankee Doodle, on 101 FAvoRrE CHILDREN'S SONGS, VOL. 3
(Special Music Records).
19. No Artist Given - Piano Rolls, Happy Days Are Here Again (Biograph Records).
20. See WILLIAM MILES, SONGS, ODES, GLEES AND BALLADS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
AMERICAN PRESIENTIAL CAMPAIGN SONGSTERS at xliv (1990). Roosevelt successfully ran for
President in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944; Truman ran successfully in 1948. See GEORGE B.
TINDALL AND DAvID E. Stn, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY (brief 2d ed. 1989) 705-708,
723-726, 750-751, 779-780, 803-805.
21. 'The Harrison song attacked Van Buren's opulent lifestyle and promoted Harrison's war
hero and homespun "Log Cabin" images:
Let Van Buren from his cooler of silver, drink wine,
And lounge on his cushioned settee,
Our man on his buckeye bench can recline;
Content with hard cidar (sic] is he!
Our man lives in a cabin built wholly of logs,
Drinks only his own cidar (sic], too;
He ploughs his own ground he feeds his own hogs,
This hero of Tippecanoe!
HENRY L. STODDARD, IT COSTS TO BE PRESIDENT 327 (1938). Stoddard claims that "[s]uch
verses turned a President out of the White House! To repeat Van Buren's own words, he was
'drunk down, sung down, and lied down."' Id at 328.
22. Research for this Comment indicates that the first adoption of a song that was popular in
its own right as a campaign theme apparently was when Al Smith used "Sidewalks of New York"
in 1924. STODDARD, supra note 21, at 307; see also CANNONBALL ADDERLEY AND MILT
JACKSON, Sidewalks of New York, on THINGS ARE GOING To GET BETTER (Original Jazz Classics
1958).
23. See supra note 1.
24. Research for this Comment has revealed no earlier non-permissive use of copyrighted
material. Senator John F. Kennedy's campaign in 1960 adopted the song "High Hopes" as its
theme, but the use appears to have been with the tacit consent of Sammy Cahn, the song's author.
Yesterdays Once More, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 18, 1992, at A2; see also FRANK SINATRA,
High Hopes, on SINATRA: CAPITOL COLLECTION SERIES (Capitol Records 1989).
25. LEE GREENWOOD, God Bless the U.S.A., on GREENWOOD: GREATEST HITS (MCA
Records 1985).
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song in an introductory video which ran prior to President Reagan's speech
at the 1984 Republican National Convention.'
The trend of adopting popular songs as campaign themes continued
in the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections. Pundits derived some amuse-
ment during both election cycles by comparing the varying use of theme
music by the campaigns.'
In 1988, candidates of both major parties used popular music. Massa-
chusetts Governor Michael Dukakis used Neil Diamond's "America,"'
most notably at the 1988 Democratic National Convention. 9 Dukakis also
used Creedence Clearwater Revival's "Fortunate Son"3 and Michael
Jackson's "Man in the Mirror"3' at campaign stops. 32  One of Dukakis'
opponents in the Democratic primary, Missouri Congressman Richard
Gephardt, borrowed one of Ronald Reagan's tactics and used Bruce
Springsteen's "Born in the U.S.A., 3  at a campaign event in New
Hampshire.' For the Republicans, Vice President George Bush utilized
Lee Greenwood's "God Bless the U.S.A.,"35 as his predecessor, Ronald
Reagan, had done four years before.36 Bush also used Bobby McFerrin's
"Don't Worry, Be Happy,"37 although McFerrin himself was a Dukakis
supporter and did not approve of Bush's use of the song.38
In 1992, all three Republican presidential primary campaigns used
theme music. President Bush used the patriotic Lee Greenwood song to
26. William V. Shannon, Election of 1984, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, 1789-1984 at 273, 297-298, (Supp. Vol. 1972-1984) (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., et
al., eds., 1986).
27. The Capital Gang (CNN television broadcast, July 18, 1992).
28. NEIL DIAMOND, America, on THE JA2z SINGER (Capitol Records 1984).
29. SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE: THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE COLD WAR
243 (1990).
30. CREEDENCE CLEARWATER REVIVAL, Fortunate Son, on CREEDENCE CLEARWATER
REVIVAL - 1969 (Fantasy Records 1969).
31. MICHAEL JACKSON, Man in the Mirror, on BAD (Epic Records 1987).
32. Grapevine, TIME, Oct. 24, 1988, at 30.
33. See supra note 1.
34. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 29, at 163.
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. Sidney Blumenthal, Bush's Early Honeymoon, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1988, at B1.
37. Marci McDonald, An Uneasy Patriotism, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 7, 1988, at 28; see also
BOBBY MCFERRIN, Don't Worry, Be Happy, on SIMPLE PLEASURES (EM! Records 1988).
38. McDonald, supra note 37, at 28. McFerrin appears to have voiced no objection directly
to the Bush campaign, although he did desire that Bush not use the song. See Grapevine, TIME,
supra note 32.
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forward his successful re-nomination effort during the primaries.39 Former
Ku Klux Klansman David Duke4° used Bryan Adams' "Every Little Thing
I Do (I Do It For You)"'" during his short-lived presidential campaign.4 2
Finally, political commentator Patrick Buchanan occasionally played
Queen's "We Will Rock You" 43 at his events.'
Several Democratic primary contenders also used theme music on one
or more occasions during the 1992 campaign. Arkansas Governor Bill
Clinton used Fleetwood Mac's "Don't Stop 45 and occasionally Paul
Simon's "Graceland '" during the primaries. At one point, Christine
39. Lloyd Grove, Democrats' Different Drummers: Rap, Reggae or Rock, the Music Carries
the Campaign Tune, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, at B1.
40. The Republican National Committee in 1991 publicly repudiated any connection with
David Duke or his political views during Duke's failed election bid for Governor of Louisiana.
"Republican National Committee Chairman Lee Atwater denounced him as a 'pretender, a
charlatan and a political opportunist.' Royal Brightbill, "Former Klansman to run for Governor,"
UPI Newswire, Jan. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. The Republican
Party, through its leader, President George Bush, endorsed Edwin Edwards, a Democrat running
against Duke. Federal News Service, "Special Transcript: The McLaughlin Group," Nov. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCHIV file. The Republican Party affirmed its
disassociation from Duke during the 1992 presidential primary in no uncertain terms. President
Bush publicly denounced Duke as a "racist' and a "bigot' in a press conference: "I'd encourage
anything to help David Duke go away .... (I]f you get the idea here I'm unenthusiastic about
the man, why, that's it, because it's bad, it's bad for our country." Federal News Service, 'Tress
Conference with President George Bush," Dec. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
WIRES file. Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, Duke should only be considered a
'major' Republican candidate for President because his campaign attracted appreciable national
attention, and his use of Bryan Adams' song was noted and commented on by both the artist and
the press.
41. BRYAN ADAMS, Every Little Thing I Do (I Do It For You), on WAKING UP THE
NEiGiBoRS (A&M Records 1991).
42. Patrick Goldstein, Pop Eye 11: And the '91 Pop Follies Awards Go To..., L.A. TmIEs, Dec.
29, 1991, at F58. Duke first used Bryan Adams' song during his bid for Governor of Louisiana,
which prompted Adams to "implore the radio stations in the state of Louisiana to pull the song
from play lists until their election is over so that none of their listeners are unintentionally
influenced to vote for this man." Beth Holland, 'I Do It for You,' But Not for Duke, NEwSDAY,
Nov. 14, 1991, at 41.
43. QUEEN, We Will Rock You, on QUEEN: GREATEST Hrrs (Hollywood Records 1992).
44. MONTREAL GAZETrE, supra note 2.
45. Ronald D. Elving, Clinton Sets Out to Recast Personal, Party Images, 50 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2075-76, July 18, 1992. The song is, on occasion, misnamed "Don't Stop Thinking
About Tomorrow." The actual name of the song is "Don't Stop." F.EErWOOD MAC, Don't Stop,
on RUMOuRs (Warner Bros. Records 1976).
46. All Things Considered: Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song (National Public Radio
broadcast, Apr. 3, 1992); see also PAUL SiMON, Graceland, on GRACELAND (Warner Bros.
Records 1986).
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McVie, the author of "Don't Stop," asked Clinton to stop using her
song.47 At the Democratic National Convention, another Paul Simon
song, "You Can Call Me Al,"' was used after vice-presidential candidate
Al Gore's speech.49 Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey used both Bruce
Springsteen's "Born to Run"50 and John Mellencamp's "Smalltown."'"
Mellencamp later asked Kerrey not to use his song.52 Massachusetts
Senator Paul Tsongas occasionally used music from Les Misdrables53 and
considered using music by Don Henley -' and John Lennon's "Power to
the People."55 California Governor Jerry Brown announced his candidacy
to Jimmy Cliff's "You Can Get It If You Really Want," 56 and Iowa
Senator Tom Harkin announced his candidacy to Franklin Roosevelt's old
standard, "Happy Days Are Here Again."'57 Of the "major" candidates for
president in 1992, only Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder did not use
47. Grove, supra note 39. However, MeVie is quoted in a later newspaper article as having
been unaware of the Clinton campaign's use of the song and claimed to have been ambivalent to
its use when she did learn of it. Steve Hochman, Christine McVie: Hail to the Chief Songwriter,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1993, at Fl. After having been alerted to MoVie's disapproval during the
primaries, Clinton campaign workers avoided using the song. All Things Considered;" Clinton's
Team ooking for Theme Song, supra note 46. Nevertheless, the song was played three times in
succession following Clinton's speech accepting the nomination of his party for President at the
Democratic National Convention. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, (CNN television
broadcast, July 17, 1992).
48. PAUL SIMON, You Can Call Me Al, on GRACELAhND (Warner Bros. Records 1986).
49. Dave Marsh, Sock Hop at The Garden, NEwSDAY, July 21, 1992, at 38. Marsh
commented on what he felt to be the inappropriate lyrics of "You Can Call Me Al," portraying
Gore as a shallow politician:
I need a photo-opportunity
I want a shot at redemption
Don't want to end up a cartoon
In a cartoon graveyard,
PAUL SIMON, You Can Call Me Al, on GRACELAND (Warner Bros. Records 1986).
50. BRUCE SPRINOsTEEN, Born to Run, on BORN TO RUN (Columbia Records 1975).
51. Grove, supra note 39; see also JOHN MELLENCAMP, Smalitown, on SCARECROW (RIVA
Records 1985).
52. Grove, supra note 39.
53. MONTREAL GAzErrE, supra note 2; see also Les Misdrables, The Complete Symphonic
Recording (Relativity Records 1988).
54. Grove, supra note 39.
55. Eye on the '90's, U.S. NEws AND WORD REP., Mar. 23, 1992, at 20; see also JOHN
LENNON, Power to the People, on JOHN LENNON COLLECTION (Capitol Records 1989).
56. Grove, supra note 39; see also JIMMY CLIFF, You Can Get It If You Really Want, on IN
CONCERT: BEST OF JIMMY CLIFF (Reprise Records 1976).
57. Grove, supra note 39; see also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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theme music.5 8 Even independent presidential candidate H. Ross Perot
adopted a theme song for his campaign, Patsy Cline's "Crazy. '59
While most of the songs used in the 1988 and 1992 campaigns were
copyrighted, this did not deter campaigns from using them.60 The attitude
of campaign officials concerning the unauthorized use of songs was
exemplified by a short colloquy between Gary Ginsberg, an advance team
member for the Clinton campaign, and National Public Radio interviewer
Barry Siegel, discussing the campaign's use of a song:
Siegel: Well, does Paul Simon, who did "Graceland"
approve of your using that at rallies?
Ginsberg: Haven't heard from Mr. Simon so we assume that
it's OK for now ...
Siegel: [Y]ou have an interesting policy about releases there.
You . . . use it at the rally and find out if they call up to
complain.
Ginsberg: Really. We don't really have a policy about.
that. We probably should. 6'
I][. LEGAL AND BusINEss BACKGROUND
A. Applicable Law
Under federal law, the owner of a copyright to a song has the
exclusive right to control public performances of the song.62 Thus, a
58. Grove, supra note 39. "major" candidates are defined here as those that attract
appreciable national media attention.
59. Mike Clancy, "Perot Dances in Last Rally, Predicts Landslide Win," Reuters Newswire,
Financial Report, Nov. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file. See also PATSY
CLRN, Crazy, on PATSY CuNE STORY (MCA Records 1988).
60. See, e.g., liner notes to BRYAN ADAMS, WAKING UP THE NEIGHBORS (A&M Records
1991), BRUCE SPRNGSTEEN, BORN IN THE U.S.A. (Columbia Records 1984), PAUL SIMON,
GRACELAND (EMI Records 1989), and FLEErWOOD MAC, RuMouRs (Warner Bros. Records
1976).
61. All Things Considereid Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46.
62. "The owner of copyright under this title [17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.] has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize. .. in the case of... musical... works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and ... to display the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1988).
"To 'display' a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a ... device or
process... ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "To 'perform' a work means to recite, render play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process." Id.
"To perform or display a work 'publicly' means - (1) to perform or display it at
a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons
1993]
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copyrighted song cannot be played in public without the owner's permis-
sion.' Virtually all songwriters affiliate with a performing rights
organization. The two leading performing rights organizations, the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") and
Broadcast Music Inc. ("BMr'), issue licenses to radio stations, television
stations, and other interested buyers in exchange for a fee." There are
many purposes for such an arrangement, but the primary reason is to allow
a songwriter and music publisher to be paid for performances of the
song.' The songwriter retains various interests in the work, including
royalties from sales of sound recordings of the song. Without these
interests, a songwriter has little economic incentive to write and produce a
song.6
Once an artist has agreed to allow a performing rights organization to
sell the licensing rights, there is little that he can do to prevent the
organization from selling the right to use his works to anyone at what may
seem a surprisingly low price.6' This sale does not exhaust an artist's
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process
ILL
63. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Playing a sound recording of a song by means of an electronic
device, such as a tape player, falls within the 17 U.S.C. § 101 definition of "display" and
"performance." See also 17 U.S.C. § 114(c) (1988) (declining to limit "the exclusive right to
perform publicly, by means of a phonorecord, any of the works specified by [17 U.S.C.] section
106(4)").
64. The right to issue public performance licenses are actually given to the organization, and
therefore the artist may no longer issue such licenses himself. BMI explains the process as
follows:
BMI acquires rights from songwriters and publishers and in turn grants licenses to
use its entire repertoire to users of music. BMI collects fees from each user of
music we license and distributes to our writers and publishers all the money
collected, other than what is needed for operating expenses.
BMI, HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS & PuBLISHERS 2 (1993).
65. 1 MEm.vLE. B. NaiMER & DAVID NammER Na4I R ON COPYRIUGHT §1.01 (1993).
66. Id.
67. BMI's royalty payment schedule typifies this. For instance, a performance on radio of
at least 90 seconds that is the sole sound broadcast at the time of the performance would incur
a six or 12 cent royalty, depending on the radio station which broadcast the song. BMT, BMI
PAYMENT ScHEDuLE 2(1988), A political campaign's use of the song would likely be considered
"Background Music for Entrances and Exits" as on television background music, and charged at
a prorated rate of 42 cents per minute. M,4, at 4-6. For instance, the song "Don't Stop" is three
minutes and 11 seconds long (FLEErWOOD MAC, RuMoURS (Warner Bros. Records 1976)); a
complete play-through would incur a royalty of $1.34 under BMI's schedule.
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ability to control the use of his work, however, since he retains an interest
in controlling his own public image.68 The artist also retains an interest
in the integrity and use of his work.69 Based upon these interests, the
artist can recover damages suffered because of "humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental distress."7 The artist can also sue for the tort of false endorse-
71ment.
B. Method of Analysis
An actual lawsuit would be an useful analytical tool for examination
of unauthorized use of popular music in political campaigns, but no suit has
been filed against a major presidential campaign. 2 Therefore, this
Comment will examine the merits of two hypothetical claims to serve the
same purpose. One hypothetical suit is Christine McVie v. Clinton/Gore
1992 Committee, and the other is Bryan Adams v. David Duke for President
1992 Committee, both concerning the 1992 presidential election."3
The facts of either hypothetical case may be considered identical.
First, the artist both wrote and recorded a song, which makes the artist both
the songwriter and the performer. Then, a presidential campaign used the
song, without seeking permission, at its rallies. The artist objected to this
68. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
69. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
70. Motschenbacher v. FL . Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 & n. 1l (9th Cir.
1974).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1989), prohibits, inter alia, false endorsements in advertising. See
Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (reading 1988 amendments to the statute
as "codify[ing] case law interpreting [15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)] to encompass false endorsement
claims"). See also Better Business Bureau v. Medical Directors, Inc., 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1982).
72. Research for this Comment included a LEXIS search for cases involving music and
presidential campaigns, last updated on October 15, 1993.
73. No such suits have been filed, and the author wishes neither to encourage nor discourage
these or other people from filing a lawsuit. These hypothetical "cases" should only be considered
as methods of exploring the law by way of illustration. Also, as to infringements during the
1984 and 1988 campaigns discussed supra at notes 23-38 and accompanying text, the three-year
statute of limitations for copyright infringement would have expired in 1991. 17 U.S.C. § 507
(1988). The hypothetical suits will occasionally be referred to as McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92 and
Adams v. Duke for President, respectively. The reader should bear in mind that the defendants
in the hypothetical suits are the campaign committees, not the candidates that the campaigns are
attempting to get elected. Finally, the careful reader looking for such things will notice the use
of the masculine gender when referring to a hypothetical plaintiff; this is done merely by
convention of the English language, and is not intended to denigrate the legal rights of the
hypothetical plaintiff Christine McVie or other females.
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use. The campaign, however, continued to use the song despite the
objection. The artist then filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent further use of
the song and requesting compensation for use of the song in the past.
IV. THE CASE AGAINST THE POLITICIANS
A. Copyright Law
The hypothetical plaintiff would sue for infringement of copyright
under 17 U.S.C. § 501.' 4 Three factors must be proven to establish a
prima facie case of copyright infringement: 1) ownership of a copyright
on the sound recording of the song, 2) defendant's access to the song, and
3) defendant's unauthorized public use of the song."
To prove ownership of a copyright, the artist only needs a certificate
from the Register of Copyright. Ownership of the song's copyright is not
likely to be contested."6 The artist may not necessarily have the right to
control use of the song, however. A performing rights organization, such
74. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988) reads, in part:
(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by [17 U.S.C. §] 106... is an infringer of the copyright.
(b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled
... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed
while he or she is the owner of it.
75. The elements of copyright infringement can be found in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
76. It is important to note that the sound recording is not at issue here. No license is
necessary for personal use of a sound recording of a song. The copyright at issue in the
hypothetical suit is unauthorized use of the song, not of the sound recording.
An example of the difference between a song and a sound recording is typified by what
is commonly called a "cover." For instance, Bob Dylan wrote and then recorded a song called
"Knockin' on Heaven's Door" in 1974. BOB DYLAN, BEFORE THE FLOOD (Columbia Records
1974). In 1982, Eric Clapton made a sound recording of Dylan's "Knocidn' on Heaven's Door."
ERIc CLAPTON, TamE PiEcE: THE BEST OF ERIc CLAPrON (Polydor Records 1982). In 1991,
the musical group Guns 'n' Roses also covered "Knockin' on Heaven's Door." GUNs 'N' ROSES,
USE YOUR ILLUSION I (Geffen Records 1991).
The words and music in all three renditions of the song were substantially similar, all
based on Dylan's songwriting. However, each version used very different instrumentation, styles
of performance, and musical arrangements. The song remains the same, though the sound
recordings change. Dylan, Clapton, and Guns 'n' Roses all were playing the same song, although
each version sounded very different from the other. As the songwriter, Bob Dylan owns the
copyright to "Knockin' on Heaven's Door." Therefore, he (or his successor in interest in the
song) should collect royalties from the use of the song, not the performers who covered it.
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as ASCAP or BMI, may have issued a license to use the song.' If this
is the case, the artist will not be able to make out a prima facie case of
copyright infringement. This is not likely to be the case, given the casual
attitude political campaigns demonstrate as to usage licensing require-
ments.78
Proving that the defendants had access to a copy of the song is also
not likely to be contested. Popular music is massively distributed and
extensively marketed in the United States. Anyone who can go into a
music store and pay a small amount of money can obtain a copy of the
sound recording of the song. No licenses are necessary to play the sound
recording, although a license would be required to perform the song itself.
Finally, establishing that the defendant used the song would also be
relatively simple. Anyone who was at the political event can assert whether
or not the song was used at the event. In addition, many campaign events
are broadcasted on television, and recordings of those television broadcasts
can be used as evidence. Such use of the song without permission violates
the copyright owner's exclusive rights.79
Demonstrating that the defendant's use was not authorized would be
slightly more difficult. Campaigns tend to operate with the idea of "tacit
consent," that the absence of objection is the same as an endorsement.80
This casual attitude would not likely hold up in court, especially in light of
the ease with which a license is available." If the defendant has not been
given the right to use the song but uses it anyway, the copyright has been
infringed.' Since the plaintiff's ownership of the work, the defendant's
access to the work, and the defendant's use of the work are all easy to
prove, the plaintiff should be able to make out a prima facie case of
copyright infringement.
77. These organizations acquire the right to issue performance licenses from the songwriter
and publisher of a song. BM!, HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS & PUBLISHERS 2 (1993).
78. See All Things Considered: Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46, and
text accompanying supra note 61.
79. In this case, the exclusive rights are to perform and display the song publicly. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4)-(5) (1988).
80. See All Things Considered: Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46. Not
having heard an objection from Paul Simon as to the use of his song, Bill Clinton's presidential
campaign acted on the assumption that Simon had in fact given permission to use the song. The
burden of preventing unauthorized use would be shifted by adopting this attitude, from the
potential copyright infringer to the copyright owner.
81. See supra note 67 (one complete play-through of "Don't Stop" would incur fees of $1.34).
Note also that a license would be sold with little, if any, inquiry into the potential for the
purchaser to damage the songwriter's or the performer's reputation.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
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B. Publicity Rights and False Endorsement
The plaintiff could assert an alternative claim based on a right of
publicity control. A claim based on a publicity rights theory is superior to
a claim based on a copyright theory because the artist may sue the defen-
dant regardless of a business decision to allow the licensing rights to be
sold by a performing rights organization. 3 A publicity rights claim is
usually based on either privacy rights or property rights.s The theory
used depends on the law of the state and the law's foundation for
recognizing the right of publicity, although the right of publicity is more
widely recognized as a property right. 6
Under either a privacy-based or property-based publicity rights theory,
the artist has the ability to control with what and with whom both his work
and his name are associated.87 In other words, by using a song without
permission, a campaign thrusts unwanted publicity on an artist. A publicity
right based on privacy adheres to the artist, regardless of who owns the
copyright. 8 Therefore, even if the plaintiff has sold his copyright interest
in the use of the song, he still has a cause of action against the defendant.
Alternatively, under a property-based theory of publicity rights, the
right to control publicity is in some instances transferrable8 9 But an artist
loses the right to sue under such a theory if the publicity rights are sold.
Therefore, assuming that the publicity rights have not been sold, the
83. Hence the superiority of a publicity rights claim - the right of publicity is not one that
a performing rights organization normally can assign. Even if a license to use the music was
obtained, the artist may still make out a publicity rights claim.
84. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (characterizing "publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public's eye" as an actionable tort within the scope
of privacy rights). See also id. at 398-401. Publicity rights based on privacy theory have been
recognized in Texas, in National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 540
(W.D. Tex. 1980), and New York, in Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S. 2d 501
(1968). New York cases are guided by a portion of the New York privacy statute, N.Y. Civil
Rights Law § 51. Id
85. Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right
of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REv. 836, 838 (1983). See also Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1992).
86. See Christopher Menjou, Comment, 'Waits v. Frito-Lay: The Ninth Circuit Rides the
Right of Publicity Down a Slippery Slope," 14 LoY. L.A. ENT. LJ. 173, 179, n. 44 (only five of
14 states with publicity rights statues recognize publicity rights under the rubric of privacy rights)
(1993), and Samuelson, supra note 85, at 838.
87. Samuelson, supra note 85, at 839.
88. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
89. Samuelson, supra note 85, at 843.
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campaign would be engaging in an activity analogous to conversion."°
The rights in question are articulated in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.9'
Ford wanted to use a Bette Midler song in one of its advertisements for the
1985 Lincoln Mercury, but Midler had refused to sing the song in the
commercial.' Ford then used a "sound-alike" singer who had formerly
been a backup singer for Midler.93 In ruling that Midler had a cause of
action, the court stated that "[a] voice is as distinctive and personal as a
face.. . . To impersonate [Midler's] voice is to pirate her identity."'
The court then held that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer
is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the
sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in
California."95
The common law right of publicity was affirmed in late 1992 in Waits
v. Frito-Lay, Inc.96 The facts in Waits are very similar to those in Midler.
Singer Tom Waits was considered for an endorsement of SalsaRio Doritos,
but the advertisers did not contact him because Waits had previously
refused on principle to endorse any product.' The defendants then hired
a different singer, whose act consisted in part of imitating Waits' vocal
style, to deliberately imitate Waits' voice for the SalsaRio Doritos
commercial. Frito-Lay then broadcasted the advertisement without
informing Waits, who learned of the commercial by hearing it on the
radio.9 Waits was awarded compensatory damages for voice misappropri-
ation, 9 which included the fair market value of his services,"e loss of
goodwill and future publicity value,'01 and "injury to [his] peace,
happiness and feelings."' " Waits was also awarded punitive damages for
90. Samuelson, supra note 85, at 843.
91. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. Id at 461.
93. 1& at 461-62.
94. 1& at 463.
95. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
96. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
97. Id at 1097-98. Waits' objection came, in part, from his regretting an endorsement of a
dog food, after which Waits felt that he had "betrayed himself." See Menjou, supra note 86, at
189 & n. 120.
98. 1d at 1098.
99. Id The court characterized this tort as "a species of violation of the 'right of publicity
d.' I
100. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102-3.
101. Id at 11034.
102. 1& at 1103, quoting Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,
recognizing compensability of a celebrity's "humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress."
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Frito-Lay's willful violation of his right of publicity."a
Furthermore, the tort of false endorsement is recognized in the
Lanham Act. t  Although the Lanham Act was originally intended to
protect against trademark infringements, its scope has been extended. 5
The tort of false endorsement applies where a defendant has appropriated
a distinctive attribute of a celebrity, giving the impression that the celebrity
endorsed the defendant in some manner.' 6 In Waits, because the Salsa-
Rio Doritos commercial could create the impression that Waits endorsed
that brand of corn chips when in fact he did not, the damages given to
Waits were found valid."°
In a hypothetical case, the plaintiff could assert that the use of his
song by a political campaign would give the false impression that he had
endorsed the candidate. He would claim that this impression damaged the
future value of his services, his goodwill and professional standing, and his
peace, happiness, and feelings." 8 By analogy, this claim would also
establish a claim for false endorsement of the candidate and his platform.
The plaintiff could make a colorable claim that the tort of false endorse-
ment reaches beyond endorsements of consumer products, especially in
light of the fact that presidential candidates are "marketed," perhaps like
detergent." 9  An artist could clearly recover for false endorsement of
103. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104-6.
104. The applicable provision of the Lanham Act reads:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . uses in
commerce any... false or misleading description [or] representation of fact, which
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
105. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976), recognized that the Lanham Act "has
been invoked to prevent misrepresentations that may injure plaintiff's business or personal
reputation, even where no registered trademark is concerned." (citation omitted).
106. E.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1979) (recognizinj validity of false endorsement claim when uniform of X-rated movie star bore
striking resemblance to plaintiff's well-known uniforms).
107. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106-11. Waits' Lanham Act damages were reversed on other
grounds, although he was awarded attorney's fees on that cause of action. Id at 1111-12.
108. These are the same injuries asserted by Tom Waits. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103.
109. See Roger Simon, Happiness is Something Called George, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1988,
at E5. The article describes an advertisement not run in the 1988 presidential election, mocking
Bush's use of the Bobby McFerrin song, "Don't Worry, Be Happy" in Bush's campaign. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text. The producers of the ad, confronted with the accusation
that advertising agencies "sell politicians like [they] sell detergent," pointed to the substantive
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detergent.10 His damages would arise from the publicity generated by
detergent advertisements. For publicity purposes, a candidate is no
different than detergent. Both are presented to the public primarily through
advertising on television and radio. Since commercial and political
advertisements provide similar exposure to the artist falsely endorsing the
product, the damages he suffers in both cases would be substantially simi-
lar.
The plaintiff in Adams v. Duke for President would have a high
probability of prevailing on such a claim. While Bryan Adams would have
to analogize commercial endorsements in case law to the political endorse-
ment in his case, the tort is driven by the damage to Adams' reputation and
emotions, rather than the Duke campaign's intent. It is thus not a difficult
analogy to make."' David Duke is likely to provoke stronger emotions
than corn chips, for both Bryan Adams and the general public. It is even
more likely that Adams, after the false endorsement of Duke, would suffer
damages to his emotions and reputation due to the political, rather than
commercial, nature of the false endorsement.
C. Moral Rights of the Artists
The doctrine of moral right is an European legal concept that grants
an artist certain rights of control over a work that he has created."'
Although "American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize
content of a detergent ad: "I'P]eople have to say: 'Boy, that's right! We should be buying that
soap!"' Id. So too with political advertisements: there must be some reason in a political ad
to motivate a voter to pick a candidate. It is for this reason that a hypothetical plaintiff such as
Bryan Adams could be harmed by false endorsement, especially if the political content of an
advertisement is obnoxious to the plaintiff (if not to most people).
110. Artists have recovered for false endorsement of a variety of products. See Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (corn chips); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
113 S. CL 2443 (1993) (television sets); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(cars).
I 1. The defendant's intent is only relevant for the issue of punitive damages, see Waits, 978
F.2d at 1104-6, and attorney's fees, see id. at 1111-12.
112. The doctrine of moral right is a broad concept, embracing many different aspects of how
an artist may control his work. One definition of this concept is as follows:
The basic rights sought to be protected under this concept comprise: the right to
create; the right to disclose or publish; the right to withdraw from publication; the
right to be identified with the work, and, the right to integrity with respect to the
work, including the right to object to the mutilation or distortion of the work.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY (6th ed. 1990) 497 (emphasis added).
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moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation,""' the policy
justifications for copyright seem to support a basis for artists to prevent
"mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the
artists are financially dependent."" 4 An artist should be able to "prevent
the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form," ' which
would include use by a political campaign that might express views the
artist believes are contrary to both the artist himself and the spirit of the
work. Bryan Adams made such a moral claim when his song was used
without permission, stating, "[elverything I am about and everything I stand
for is diametrically opposed to David Duke.""' 6 Morally, then, it seems
that an artist should be able to exert some control over a work based on the
political views expressed through its use.
An example of such a claim is found in Shostakovich v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp.,"1 where authors of music in the public domain
attempted to prevent its use in a film which they felt to be contradictory to
their own political philosophy."' Their theory was that use of the music
would identify the composer with a certain point of view." 9 The court
could reconcile this concept only with a theory based on moral rights."
However, the court stated that "[iun the present state of our law the very
existence of the right is not clear," and it required "a clear showing of the
infliction of a wilful injury or of any invasion of a moral right."'' Not
finding such, the Shostakovich court denied the plaintiffs' motion for an
injunction against showing the film or restricting its soundtrack."
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co."'3 discussed the extent of an
artist's moral rights in the United States. When the BBC sold its broadcast
rights for the comedy series "Monty Python's Flying Circus" to ABC, Terry
Gilliam and other members of the comedy troupe Monty Python were
"'appalled' at the discontinuity and 'mutilation' that had resulted from the
editing" of their work."4 Monty Python sued to prevent ABC from
113. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24. (2d Cir. 1976).
114. Id. (finding policy justification in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), and
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)).
115. Gilliam, 538 F.2d 14, 24.
116. Holland, supra note 42, at 41.
117. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948), aff'd, 275 A.D.2d 692 (1949).
118. Id at 578.
119. Id The Shostakovich court found that the association did not libel the plaintiffs. Id.
120. Id at 577-9.
121. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
122. Id.
123. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
124. Id at 18.
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broadcasting the edited specials.1 5 Finding that an "injury to [Monty
Python's] theatrical reputation would imperil their ability to attract [an]
audience" that could not be "measured in monetary terms or recompensed
by other relief,"' 6 a panel of the Second Circuit granted the injunc-
tion. 7 Gilliam implies that moral rights might be recognized in the
United States, to a limited degree, under the rubric of property rights."n
Read in this fashion, Gilliam extended moral rights to protect against the
mutilation of a work.' 9
The plaintiff might argue that a court should accept Gilliam's
invitation to extend property rights to prevent misrepresentation of the work
as endorsing or associating the song and the artist with a political cam-
paign. It is possible, in spite of the holding of the Shostakovich court, to
recognize some moral rights of an artist under a property rights theory.
Additionally, a case such as Adams v. Duke for President can be
distinguished from Shostakovich in one important respect: the music used
without permission by the defendants in Shostakovich was in the public
domain, while "Every Little Thing I Do (I Do It For You)"'30  is
copyrighted. Use of copyrighted music is controlled,' 31 while anyone in
the world may use a work that is in the public domain. 32  Therefore,
Adams would have a stronger case for establishing a moral rights claim,
since he has taken legal steps to prevent unauthorized use of his work.
D. Remedy Sought
1. Legal Remedies
The standard legal remedy for unauthorized use of copyrighted
material is to require the infringer to pay actual damages and profits
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 19.
127. I& at 26.
128. "Although such decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they
also properly vindicate the author's personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the
public in a distorted form." Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
129. Id. at 24-25 (alterations made to plaintiff's television program prior to broadcast by
defendant); see n.12 (describing the distortion to the content of the program).
130. See supra note 41.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (1988).
132. "When a work is 'in' or has 'fallen into' the public domain it means it is available for
unrestricted use by anyone. Permission and/or payment are not required for use." BMI, A GUEDE
TO MUSIC PUBLISHING TEIuMNoLoGY 9 (1992).
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accruing from the use.'33 However, no profits or revenues are realized
by a campaign as a result of using a song."' The campaign hopes to
"rouse a crowd... [and to] enthuse the candidate" by use of the song.'"
The campaign hopes to transform this enthusiasm into volunteer efforts and
eventually into votes for its candidate. Therefore, none of the "profits"
resulting from the use of a song in a presidential campaign are quantifiable.
Even assuming that it were possible to determine the increased
number of votes that a candidate received from the use of a song, those
votes could not be transferred as damages to a copyright owner. Votes are
not transferrable like poker chips from one person to another. A voter casts
his ballot for a politician, not an artist, and the artist would very likely not
be a presidential candidate in the first place. Furthermore, the plaintiff
would be constitutionally ineligible to receive those votes for President,
since he is not a native-born American citizen. 36
However, damages resulting from unauthorized use of the work may
be more easily quantifiable than profits. Here, the reasoning resembles that
of a publicity rights theory - the campaign is associating itself with the
artist to the artist's detriment, and the artist is entitled to protect his public
image. One possible measure of this damage would be to examine the rise
and fall in the sales of a plaintiff's recordings as a result of this association
with the campaign. 3' Such damage would likely be found to be de
minimis. Sales of an artist's albums are not likely to be impacted
significantly simply because a politician is using the song, and thus any
133. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988); Dorchester Music Corp. v. NBC, 171 F. Supp. 580,588 (S.D.
Cal. 1959).
134. See All Things Considered: Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46,
as to the benefits a campaign realizes from using a song at an event such as a rally.
135. lId
136. U.S. CONST. art. H1, § 1, cl. 5, states that "[n]o person except a natural born Citizen, or
a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President." Neither hypothetical plaintiff is an American citizen: Christine
McVie is English, see Robert Hilburn, Big Mac is Back, Together Again for an Album, But For
How Long?. L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1987, at F60, and Bryan Adams Canadian, see Holland, supra
note 42, at 39.
137. This, however, is a difficult proposition. Either hypothetical case defies easy
examination. In McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92, the Fleetwood Mac song is sufficiently old to have
a nearly constant "sales curve" and in Adams v. Duke for President the Bryan Adams song was
sufficiently recent to be within the standard sales curve of a new release. At the time of the Duke
campaign's use of the song, sales were likely tapering off in spite of the minimal association
between artist and campaign. A court would be hard-pressed to determine to what extent the drop
in popularity of the song was caused by association with Duke and what portion of the drop in
popularity would have occurred anyway. The absence of a boycott of the artists also suggests that
the reason for a decline in sales is not association of the artist with the campaign.
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damages awarded for loss of sales would be nominal.
Alternatively, once a prima facie case of copyright infringement has
been made, there is a presumption of irreparable damage. 3 Therefore,
the plaintiff might request statutory damages in the absence of quantifiable
monetary damage. Two sections of copyright law are applicable. A
plaintiff may pursue "statutory damages for all infringements involved in
the action, with respect to any one work.., in a sum of not less than $500
or more than $20,000. ' 139 Also, the damages are increased "where -the
copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that
infringement was committed willfully, [to] not more than $100,000."'I
In the hypothetical case of McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92, proving that the
Clinton campaign willfully used "Don't Stop" would be easy. Statutory
damages would probably be the most acceptable legal remedy for McVie
to pursue, since this remedy would yield the largest potential recovery. The
exact amount of the award is set by the judge."'
A significant problem exists with legal remedies of any kind, due to
the nature of the defendants as political campaigns. Commonly, "presi-
dential campaigns... leave various creditors with empty hands."'42 For
instance, Colorado Senator Gary Hart's 1984 presidential bid ran up debts
of $1.4 million, most of which have been paid off, and Ohio Senator John
Glenn's 1984 presidential campaign was still three million dollars in debt
eight years later.'43 Additionally, campaign committees are almost always
in debt continuously through the end of the election season." Good
election strategy in modem presidential elections usually mandates heavy
spending very early in the process, specifically during the Iowa caucus,
138. Wainwright Sees. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1977).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
141.17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988).
142. Marianne Lavelle, Can Hart Take From '88 to Pay '84?, NAT'L LJ., February 8, 1988,
at 3 (quoting Warren S. Rosenfeld, representing a creditor to Colorado Senator Gary Hart's 1984
presidential campaign seeking to collect $11,000).
143. Neil A. Lewis, The 1992 Campaign: Campaign Finances; For Democratic Candidates,
Deficits Are the Rule, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 1992, at A27. Senator Glenn himself described his
1984 bid for the Presidency: "I humiliated my family, gained 16 pounds and went over $2.5
million in debt. Other than that, it was a great experience." RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE
PRESIDENTIAL ODYSSEY OF JOHN GLENN 293 (1990) (emphasis added).
144. Lewis, supra note 143, at A27. "[Fior most [presidential candidates], running their
campaigns on a deficit has been a way of life." Id.
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New Hampshire primary, and "Super Tuesday."'45 The remainder of the
campaign season is often financed by borrowing funds from creditors
against projected future fundraising and accompanying federal matching
funds.'4
Given the amount of time required to conduct litigation, it is highly
probable that by the time the plaintiff wins his suit, the defendant would be
completely judgment-proof. "Debt reduction is the toughest kind of fund
raising imaginable," according to one political fundraiser, 47 and it is
possible that the odium of a legal judgment against the campaign would
only make that task more difficult. The plaintiff would have to "get in
line" with all of the other unsecured claimants against the defunct campaign
committee and wait years before seeing a penny, even were the defendant
eventually able to produce any money. 4'
One possible source of compensatory damages suggests itself: funds
raised for the candidate's next campaign. A successful candidate will often
run for re-election; certainly in the hypothetical case of McVie v. Clinton/-
Gore '92, it is highly likely that Bill Clinton, the ultimately successful
candidate, will seek re-election in 1996. McVie might seek to attach
President Clinton's re-election campaign funds for 1996. However, such
an attachment would run afoul of a Federal Elections Commission (FEC)
decision relating to former Colorado Senator Gary Hart's bids for the
Presidency in 1984 and 1988, where the FEC ruled that debts cannot be
transferred from one campaign to another."4 Therefore, the plaintiff
145. For an interesting discussion of this and related topics, see generally CMPAIGN FOR
PRESIDENT: THE MANAGERS LOOK AT '88 (David R. Runkel, ed. 1989), especially at 175-179
for the financial pressures imposed on presidential campaigns by the existence of twenty
simultaneous primary elections on "Super Tuesday" in 1988. Notable is a quote from Larry
Eichel, a reporter from the Philadelphia Enquirer "(O]ur understanding of primary politics is
that with few exceptions most candidates are in a situation where they have to be spending money
very quickly as it comes in .... " Id. at 179. See also Lewis, supra note 143, at A27 ('running
[presidential] campaigns on a deficit has been a way of life"). In other words, at least during
the primary stage of a presidential campaign, money is spent as fast as it comes in, if not faster.
146. See Runkel, supra note 145. The discussion dealt directly with Congressman Richard
Gephardt's presidential campaign in 1988. See also Lewis, supra note 143 ("There is a general
guideline that campaigns should try not to borrow much more than could be anticipated in Federal
matching funds.")
147. Lewis, supra note 143 (quoting Nicholas Rizzo, campaign finance chairman for former
Sen. Paul Tsongas' 1992 presidential campaign).
148. A successful plaintiff in the hypothetical cases would almost certainly be in the same
position as a creditor to a past campaign, described in Lavelle, supra note 142 ("'There is no legal
way, I believe, for [creditors] to collect those debts,' says David M. Ifshin, a Democratic election
lawyer ... who served as 1984 presidential candidate Walter F. Mondale's campaign counsel.")
149. Id
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would have to extract funds from the defunct campaign, while the candidate
himself would be able to run for re-election without this financial burden.
The probability of a plaintiff's securing these funds, as noted above, would
be quite low.
2. Equitable Remedy
Because of the problems with pursuing monetary damages, the relief
sought would most likely be equitable in nature. When considering the
probability that a lawsuit would last longer than the election, an artist
seeking to prevent the unauthorized use of his song would be well-advised
to seek a preliminary injunction against a campaign's use of his song,
ostensibly pending final litigation. As demonstrated above, the artist would
probably have to content himself with the injunction and no legal damages.
A suit for injunctive relief would greatly resemble Keep Thomson
Governor Committee v. Citizens for Gallen Committee.5 ' In Thomson,
the plaintiff, a campaign to re-elect the incumbent Governor of New Hamp-
shire, had commissioned a song entitled "Live Free or Die.'... The
campaign purchased the copyright from the artists and sold sound
recordings of the song, apparently both as a political promotion and as a
means of raising funds. 52 The defendant campaign committee used a
portion of the song in its political commercials.'53 The rival campaign's
commercial played a short segment of "Live Free or Die" and criticized the
incumbent's platform.' The Thomson campaign invoked its exclusive
rights to use the sound recording under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. and sued
to enjoin the Gallen campaign from playing the commercial that used a
portion of "Live Free or Die."'55 The court considered four factors in
denying the injunction: "(1) The significance of the threat of irreparable
harm if the injunction is not granted; (2) the balance between this harm and
the injury that granting an injunction would inflict on the defendant; (3) the
probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public inter-
est.'
156
The court in Thomson presumed irreparable harm after the prima facie
150. 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
151. Id. at 958.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 959.
154. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 959.
155. Id.
156. IM.
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showing of copyright infringement, and found that the plaintiff had met the
first of the four factors." However, the court then found that the
defendant's inability to express its political views during a campaign would
greatly harm both the defendant and the public, invoking significant First
Amendment concerns of protecting free political speech.' Additionally,
the Thomson court believed it unlikely that the plaintiff would succeed on
the merits, since the court anticipated a successful fair use defense. 59
The Thomson court therefore denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction.' 6°
Thomson provides a good framework for dealing with political cam-
paigns and copyright issues, but the outcome in the hypothetical cases
would be very different from Thomson. First, the court would probably
accede to the presumption of irreparable harm, disposing of the first factor
in favor of the plaintiff.' Second, the harm caused to the defendant by
granting the injunction would be slight. One campaign strategist notes that
"that kind of music doesn't really reach the community of politically active
people."'1 62 Since the harm to the defendant would be minimal, the
second factor would be decided for the plaintiff as well. The third factor
would favor granting the injunction, because the plaintiff would have a very
strong case on the merits.' 63 Finally, the court would weigh the public
interest of allowing this kind of unauthorized use of copyrighted material
to continue in the face of the copyright owner's objections. Consider
McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92. The public had an interest in the ability of the
electorate to make an informed choice about candidate Bill Clinton, because
of the tremendous effect that Clinton would have had on national policy if
elected to the office of President.'" But, given the facts that the song
existed sixteen years before the campaign found a vehicle for its message
157. Id. (following Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1977)).
158. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 959-60.
159. I at 960. The fair use defense is discussed in detail infra at notes 172-186 and
accompanying text.
160. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 961. After the plaintiffs raised a cause of action for unfair
competition, the court found that the relevant statutes were inapposite to the facts of the case.
161. Wainwright, 558 F.2d 91 (presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement).
162. Grove, supra note 39 (quoting Republican National Committee Chief of Staff Mary
Matalin).
163. See supra notes 74-132 and accompanying text.
164. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-45 (1976). Buckley paints the public interest in
broader terms, covering candidates for public office generally; obviously this would include
candidates for President of the United States.
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in the song'( and that the lyrical content is not explicitly political, t"
the public's interest in robust political debate would not have been paid a
disservice by excluding the song from the political forum.
Under a Thomson analysis, McVie would therefore likely prevail on
the merits, and the result would be that the preliminary injunction would
be granted. Consider what would have happened had McVie sued the
Clinton campaign in the early stages of the 1992 primaries: the campaign
could no longer have used "Don't Stop" at campaign events"67 until the
claims were litigated, resulting in an effective victory for McVie. Even
assuming an ultimate victory for the Clinton campaign at trial, in all
probability the election would have long since passed and McVie would no
longer be interested in the litigation. Once a court issued the preliminary
injunction, the Clinton campaign would likely have found that the costs of
using the song far outweighed the benefits. Also, the campaign might well
have been embarrassed by the controversy and negative publicity surround-
ing litigation and feared bad press more than any fines it would have had
to pay.
168
An additional advantage to seeking injunctive relief is that under the
copyright laws, a preliminary injunction is enforceable nationwide.
169
Because copyright is under exclusive federal jurisdiction 70 and because
of a desire to prevent separate suits in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, the provision allows for adequate national enforcement of copy-
right laws. A preliminary injunction granted in any state will prevent the
hypothetical defendant from using a song at all campaign events throughout
165. "Don't Stop" was copyrighted in 1976 by Gentoo Music and was "a hit in 1977, the last
time a Democrat was inaugurated President," Elving, supra note 45, at 2076.
166. The substantive content of "Live Free or Die" was described as "approximately 60
seconds of narration relative to the tradition and spirit of New Hampshire" and does not elaborate
on the exact lyrical content of the song. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 959.
Debatably, the emotional content and lyrical message of "Don't Stop" convey a spirit of
optimism, energy, and hope. The Clinton campaign would understandably want to associate
those emotions with its candidate, but that message is not explicitly political.
167. See supra note 46.
168. This appears to be the reason that, when an artist makes a request to a campaign to stop
using his songs, campaigns typically have complied. Indeed, to continue the example described
in the text, Christine McVie at one point asked the Clinton campaign to stop using "Don't Stop"
at campaign events, and the Clinton campaign took pains not to use the song. See All Things
Considered, Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46; but cf supra note 47.
169. An injunction received pursuant to copyright law (17 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) "shall be
enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court having
jurisdiction of that person." 17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (1988).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
1993]
160 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
the entire country."' Therefore, a preliminary injunction would be the
most favored remedy for the plaintiff.
V. DEFENSES: "I DIDN'T INHALE AND I DIDN'T LISTEN EITHER!"
The hypothetical defendant campaign would have several strong argu-
ments to assert in defense of its actions. The campaign could concede
some of the plaintiff's factual propositions with no harm to their defense.
Specifically, the defendant campaign could admit using the plaintiff's song
at events and concede ownership of the song's copyright to the plaintiff.
Moreover, the defense strategy would likely be aimed at postponing the
preliminary injunction for as long as possible. Attorneys defending the
campaigns might employ dilatory litigation tactics, seeking to delay an
inevitable loss. More effective, however, would be presenting a four-tiered
defense. First, the defendant would assert fair use. Second, the defendant
would claim that the campaign's use of the song should be considered
within certain exceptions of copyright law. Third, the defendant would
challenge the plaintiff's standing. Finally, the defendant campaign would
argue that it is protected by the First Amendment, which would afford the
defendant campaign great protection by virtue of its status as a political
campaign.
A. Fair Use
The law provides for a limitation on the exclusive rights of a
copyright holder if the unauthorized use is "fair."'" Fair use will likely
be the hypothetical defendant's first line of defense against a copyright
claim. The statute lists four factors for consideration which the defendant
would address in raising a fair use defense. The cautious scholar will note
that the statute is only meant to codify an existing common law doctrine,
making judicial inquiry into specific claims of fair use potentially broader
171. Such a suit could theoretically be brought in any Federal District Court in the country.
For convenience of jurisdiction and enforcement, the suit might be brought in a state such as Iowa
or New Hampshire, due to their early placement in the Presidential primary season, or whichever
state the campaign announced that its next event would be in. California law, however, is
favorable to a publicity rights claim, discussed supra at notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
California may also be a geographically convenient forum for the plaintiff, since it is a state
where a great many musicians and songwriters reside.
172. "[IThe fair use of a copyrighted work, including ... phonorecords ... for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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than the four factors outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 107.' 7' Nevertheless, these
factors are usually sufficient for finding whether an unauthorized use is fair
or not.74 An analysis of the Adams v. Duke for President hypothetical
case thus need not look beyond the statute's listed factors.
"The purpose and character of the use, including whether such is of
a commercial nature or for nonprofit educational purposes" is the first
factor considered in determining whether there has been a fair use.'"5
Neither an educational nor a commercial use would exist in Adams v. Duke
for President, unless playing the song was an integral part of a Duke fund-
raising event. However, fundraising would not appear to be the Duke
campaign's purpose for using "Every Little Thing I Do (I Do It For You),"
given the objectives described by campaign workers. 76 Since the
purpose and character of the use is neither commercial nor educational, this
factor would not favor either party.
Second, "the nature of the copyrighted work" is considered.' 7 "Ev-
ery Little Thing I Do (I Do It For You)" was written for profit. 78
Adams presumably hoped to sell sound recordings of the song and thus
support himself through royalty payments. He also hoped that the publicity
surrounding one song will help build his public image, enabling him to
later sell additional songs. Like all artists, Adams realized that individuals
will use these sound recordings privately and licensed them to do so by
releasing the song for public purchase.179 Because the song was created
for profit, its unpaid appropriation by the Duke campaign contradicts its
reason for existence. This factor would thus favor Adams.
The third factor considered is "the amount and substantiality of the
173. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NMMtER, NanMR ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05, at 13-86
(1993).
174. Id. at 13-87.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
176. See All Things Considered, Clinton's Campaign Team Looking for Theme Song, supra
note 46 (describing the Clinton campaign's purposes in using songs to "rouse" and "enthuse").
It is safe to presume that the Duke campaign's use was for similar purposes.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
178. See supra note 41 (song appears on a commerically-released album).
179. Increasingly, artists seek to advance political statements coincidental to releasing a song
for profit. Obviously, not all artists do this and even the "political" songs are still expected to
turn a profit for the artist. There is considerable debate as to whether certain political messages,
inserted into the song, improve its profitability, and whether including political messages in songs
is responsible behavior. To the extent that an artist's political message and a campaign's political
message coincide, it would appear that an artist has no complaint about being associated with a
campaign. But, given this argument, an artist has a stronger incentive to distinguish his political
message from a campaign's once his song has become associated with it, if the campaign does
not accurately reflect his views.
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portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."' so If only
a short excerpt from the song were used, this factor would favor the
defendant. However, the usual campaign event includes a complete or
nearly complete use of the song. If a substantial portion of the work were
used, which was qualitatively recognizable as representing the entire work,
then this factor would favor the plaintiff.' If the court finds that the
quantity of the work used is insubstantial, then this factor will weigh in
favor of the defendant. In both hypothetical cases, however, the songs were
played all the way through; in the McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92 case, "Don't
Stop" was played three times in succession at one event." It is therefore
probable that this factor would also weigh in favor of the plaintiff.
Finally, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work" is considered." 3 This factor would likely be
decided in favor of the defendant because it is interpreted as the difference
• . . between the benefit the public will derive if the use is
permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive
if the use is denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged
infringing use has on the copyright owner's expectation of gain,
the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use."'
Returning to the Adams v. Duke for President hypothetical, Adams'
expectation of gain or loss has little to do with the infringing use. Sales of
"Every Little Thing I Do (I Do It For You)" would not likely have been
affected by the Duke campaign's use of the song, if the general public is
able to distinguish between a musician and a politician."8 5 Therefore, this
factor would weigh in favor of the defendant.
The nature and use of the work by the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's song should not be found to be a fair use. Fair uses are typically
180. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
181. Roy Export Co. Establishment v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afid, 672
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (copying 75 seconds of a 72 minute movie is a substantial use, in
qualitative terms). But cf. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 961 (15 seconds of three-minute recording
for purposes of political criticism is sufficiently insubstantial as to allow a fair use defense).
182. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION (CNN television broadcast, July 17, 1992). The
convention played "Don't Stop" three times in a row after Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton gave
his speech accepting the Democratic Party's nomination for President, accompanied by a festive
drop of rainbow-colored balloons and general revelry in Madison Square Garden. Id
183. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
184. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
185. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. While cynics might suggest that this is not
a foregone conclusion, the focus of any campaign is the candidate, see Runkel, supra note 145,
not accompanying "window dressing" serving a subsidiary purpose. See also All Things
Considered: Clinton's Team Looking for Theme Song, supra note 46.
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educational or charitable in nature," 6 and the Duke campaign did not use
the work for either purpose. The public benefit accrued from allowing the
use of Bryan Adams' song by David Duke's political campaigns is
minimal, at best. While there would be little market effect from use of the
song at a political event, other fair use factors should outweigh this
consideration. Consequently, the Duke campaign would likely fail to raise
a successful fair use defense.
B. Statutory Exceptions to Copyright Infringement
17 U.S.C. § 110 provides specific exceptions to copyright infringe-
ment for certain actions. The defendant might assert that its use of the
plaintiff's song falls into one of these exceptions. While political
campaigns are not specifically mentioned in § 110, the defendant might
nevertheless attempt to invoke the exceptions.
One exception provides that "communication of a transmission
embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of
the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used
in private homes" is not an infringement of a copyright.'87 This provi-
sion, however, does not apply to the use of the song. For example, in the
McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92 hypothetical case, the song "Don't Stop" was
played at the Democratic National Convention at Madison Square Gar-
den."8 The receiving apparatus within Madison Square Garden would
not be of the type commonly found in private homes, 89 so it would not
be covered by the exception, unlike the common radio and television units
to which the exception applies.19g
Political rallies might fall under another exception, which states that
186. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) lists specific uses "such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching ... scholarship, or research" as within the fair use exception. It is not meant to be an
exhaustive list, however, see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
562 (1985). Nevertheless, political rallies seem to fall outside the flavor of the enumerated fair
uses.
187. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1988).
188. See supra notes 45 and 182 and accompanying text.
189. Telephone Interview with Madison Square Garden Facilities Management, New York,
N.Y. (Nov. 29, 1992).
190. Interestingly, then, the copyright was not violated as to the millions of people who
watched the convention on TV, but it was violated as to the thousands of people who were at the
convention itself. This seems counter-intuitive in that a nonpermissive use of a sound recording
with a select (if large) group of people appears to do less harm to an artist's exclusive control
over his work than nonpermissive broadcast of that work to a national, indeed a global, audience.
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a copyright is not infringed by a "performance of a... musical work...
without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and without
payment of any fee or other compensation for the performance to any of its
performers, promoters, or organizers, if... there is no direct or indirect
admission charge."''
Arguably, this exception applies to the hypothetical cases. A
recording of a musical work is played by means of an electronic device.
The campaign presumably seeks no commercial advantage, assuming that
no fee is charged nor money solicited from participants at a campaign event
and the song is not used at fundraising events. Thus, political rallies seem
to fall within the exception. However, if any fee was charged to delegates
at the convention, this could be seen as a monetary gain for the defendants.
The defendants could also have had an indirect intent to gain money.
By playing the song at rallies, enthusiasm for the candidate is increased,
and higher levels of political participation will result. In addition to more
phone bank volunteers and precinct walkers, the number of campaign
donations would increase as a result of heightened enthusiasm. Therefore,
an indirect financial gain probably does accrue to the defendant by its use
of the song. Should the plaintiff make this argument, it would have a
strong chance of defeating the assertion of this exception.
C. Standing
1. Copyright Claim
Another line of defense for the defendant is to assert that the plaintiff
lacks standing to sue, based on the theory that he has not sustained an
injury in fact." Both Thomson and Shostakovich illustrate that an
unharmed plaintiff lacks standing."93 The defendant would allege that the
plaintiff must prove that he had suffered a loss of sales, or that his public
191.17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (1988).
192. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief").
193. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 961, (finding that "the effect of the use upon the potential
market or value of the copyrighted work is nil. The recordings have sold and are continuing to
sell without substantial commercial loss to the plaintiff"). Cf Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575,
578, (finding that "[tihere is no ground for any contention that plaintiffs have.., given their
approval or endorsement [to a motion picture contrary to their political beliefs]"). The
Shostakovich court relied, however, on the fact that the works used in the motion picture were
within the public domain, while the works in question in the hypothetical cases are copyrighted.
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image had suffered a negative impact as a result of his association with the
campaign or the candidate. The defendant campaign would argue that the
plaintiff's damage can only be measured in terms of a decline in sales. An
examination of sales charts would very likely demonstrate that the
plaintiff's albums continued to sell as they had prior to the defendant's use
of the music.
In Shostakovich, the plaintiffs' music was used in a movie which ex-
pressed opinions contrary to their political views.' The Shostakovich
court rejected the argument that "[t]he use of plaintiffs' music... indicates
their 'approval,' 'endorsement' and 'participation' in the defendant's
film.' 9 The court found "no ground" for this assumption and said that
approval was not "necessarily implie[d]."'96 Therefore, the plaintiffs did
not have standing to sue because they had sustained no injury.
Although the plaintiff's claims are similar to those in Shostakovich,
two factual differences suggest that a court may reach a contrary result.
First, the works in Shostakovich were "in the public domain and [enjoyed]
no copyright protection whatever."'" Since no copyright had been
claimed over the works, anyone could have used them without seeking the
permission of the artist.'98 In the hypothetical cases, the works have been
copyrighted, and the artists have sought to maintain control over when and
how their works are presented. Their purpose in ensuring payment of
royalties is not relevant; what matters is that they retain control. Second,
a presumption of irreparable harm to the plaintiff once a copyright has been
infringed was created in Wainwright, a presumption which did not exist at
the time of Shostakovich.' Wainwright postdates Shostakovich by
twenty-nine years, and the hypothetical cases postdate Shostakovich by at
least forty-four years. The defendant may attempt to rebut this presumption
by noting that sales of the plaintiff's album have not appreciably declined,
disproving the negative association with the candidate or the campaign.
Plaintiff's injuries could be characterized as similar to those suffered by the
plaintiffs in Warth v. Seldin, ° who sought to enjoin the application of
a municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting low-cost housing in Penfield,
New York." The Court distinguished between the availability of low-
194. Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575.
195. 1d at 578.
196. Id
197. 1d at 577.
198. See id
199. Wainwright, 558 F.2d 91.
200. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
201. 1d
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cost housing in Penfield and the zoning ordinance and determined that there
was no injury in fact.2' The Court stated that the plaintiffs' "inability to
reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the area housing
market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts." 3
In the Adams v. Duke for President hypothetical, the Duke campaign
would argue that the injury asserted by Adams (loss of sales) was not
caused by Adams' alleged association with David Duke, but rather by
normal market processes. However, the presumption of irreparable harm
would likely be controlling. Normal market fluctuations were not a factor
considered by the court in Wainwright.2°4 Therefore, if Adams can prove
ownership of the copyright, he will likely be found to have standing to sue.
Again, the distinction between the song and the sound recording becomes
significant 5 - the sound recording is likely to be copyrighted by a
record company, not Adams himself. If Adams sues on the copyright for
the sound recording of a song, he would not have standing because he does
not own the copyright. However, since the suit is for copyright violation
of the song itself, the standing defense will likely fail, allowing Adams to
proceed with his suit.
2. False Endorsement and Publicity Rights Claims
Waits v. Frito-Lay°6 provides strong precedent for establishing
standing in a publicity rights or false endorsement claim. When Frito-Lay
used a "sound-alike" of Tom Waits to endorse its product, Waits had
standing to sue both for false endorsement and voice misappropriation. °'
The controlling factor was that the plaintiff had "a commercial interest in
the misused mark."208
The defendant in Adams v. Duke for President could argue, as Frito-
Lay did in Waits, that the false endorsement claim is invalid under the
Lanham Act, since it only applies to competitors in an unfair competition
202. L. at 505-6.
203. Id at 506. But see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (implying that a substantial probability that a causal relationship between discriminatory
zoning practice and plaintiffs' inability to purchase a home could exist, but denying relief because
plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants were motivated by racial discrimination).
204. The Wainwright court concerned itself with "a probability of success on the merits, or
a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships in his favor." Id. at 94.
205. See supra note 76.
206. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
207. Id. at 1107-10.
208. Id at 1109. In this case, the plaintiff's mark is his identity.
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claim.2 9 However, this argument was rejected in Waits and would likely
be rejected in Adams' case as well. False endorsement, by its very nature,
almost always involves a noncompetitor.21° "Standing, therefore, does not
require 'actual competition' in the traditional sense; it extends to a
purported endorser who has an economic interest akin to that of a
trademark holder in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her
identity."211 Since actual competition with David Duke in the political
arena is unnecessary and since Bryan Adams as a professional entertainer
has a clear economic interest in his identity,22 he would almost certainly
be found to have standing for these causes of action.23
D. First Amendment
Finally, the defendant may invoke the First Amendment in defense of
its actions. 214 Virtually all scholars and jurists agree that the First Amen-
dment protects speech that is political in nature, since free political
discourse is the very core of the First Amendment's raison d'etre.215
Because the defendant campaign is engaged in forwarding the political
process (indeed, it is in many ways the focus of the political process),
extraordinary First Amendment protection should apply to it. Courts have
traditionally been quite deferential to speech by political candidates and
campaigns as political expression.216 One court has noted that:
[n]o activity is more basic to the maintenance of a democratic
society than that which develops the knowledge, debate, and
information necessary to enable our citizens to best exercise
their electoral franchise, and thereby facilitate the election of
209. Id. at 1107.
210. Id. at 1107-10.
211. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110.
212. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en
banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 2443 (1993); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
213. This is clearly the case given California law, see supra notes 91-107 and accompanying
text. A suit in a state other than California would rely on that state's law for a publicity right
claim. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
214. U.S. CONS". amend. I reads in applicable part, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble."
215. Eg., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,425 (1988); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L. REv. 1 (1971); and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 785-787 (2d ed. 1988).
216. See e.g., Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Associates, 520 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1987).
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leaders who will guide and shape the policies and programs of
our institutions.""
Where exclusive rights under copyright law have been invoked
counter to a political expression claim, courts have favored the First
AmendmenL2 8  However, prior First Amendment claims invoked by
defendants are distinguishable from either hypothetical case.
In Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Associates, the plaintiff, a New York disc
jockey, was paid to record a narration for a television commercial used in
a 1985 campaign to re-elect the Governor of New Jersey.2 19 A four-
second excerpt of the plaintiff's voice was used by the opposing campaign
in its own commercial, criticizing the incumbent's record.' The plaintiff
had sold all interest in the recording of his voice to the Governor's re-
election campaign, but the court found that any "minimal property right that
Dukas may have had in the four-second, ten-word segment is far out-
weighed by the public's right to free and unfettered political debate." '
Because the use in Dukas was for criticism of the incumbent's political
record, as advertised in the commercial in which the plaintiff's voice
appeared, the Dukas Court did not reach the fair use issue because it was
so moved by the First Amendment concerns protecting political speech.'m
In Thomson, as previously noted, a fifteen-second excerpt from plain-
tiff's song was used in defendant's political commercial.3 The Thomson
court found that the "First Amendment issues of freedom of expression in
a political campaign"' resolved the question of fair use in favor of the
defendant.
However, the uses in Dukas and Thomson were quite minor in
comparison to the use in McVie v. Clinton/Gore '92. Also, the uses in
Dukas and Thomson were directly related to criticism of political oppo-
nents. In fact, the defendants in both cases had taken material directly from
their rival campaigns' political material (from a promotional record in
Thomson and a radio commercial in Dukas) and used them for the purpose
217. Davis v. Duryea, 417 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (1979).
218. See Thomson, 457 F. Supp. 957, and Dukas, 520 N.Y.S.2d 306.
219. Dukas, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
220. Id.
221. Id at 308.
222. Id. "Property rights must be balanced against the public's interest in the 'free discussion
of governmental affairs."' Id. (quoting Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 960).
223. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 959.
224. Id. at 961.
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of criticism.' The Clinton campaign used "Don't Stop" for a purpose
that did not forward substantive debate on political issues. The campaign's
use of 'Don't Stop" was not educational. "Don't Stop" makes no political
statements. Its use at campaign events was intended to produce an
emotional reaction in participants of the political process, not to advance
"the free discussion of governmental affairs." 6 There was no political
message in the song as it was used by the Clinton campaign, and as such
is not political speech.'
The First Amendment clearly protects political speech, including the
right of the Clinton campaign to have a political rally. However, it does
not protect the rights of a campaign to do whatever it wishes at such a
rally.' Therefore, the First Amendment would likely fai to protect the
Clinton campaign from a lawsuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The practice of playing popular songs at political rallies has grown to
be a common feature of contemporary political campaigns. 9 For most,
it is an insignificant detail; for others, the subject of some amusement. For
the artists whose work is appropriated, however, this may be serious
business indeed."0 Every detail of a presidential campaign is scrutinized
225. In Thomson, the defendant copied 15 seconds of plaintiff's song and then criticized the
plaintiff's political program. Md. at 959. In Dukas, an even shorter excerpt from a competing
political commercial was used prior to similar criticism of the incumbent's political program.
Dukas, 520 N.Y.S.2d 306. Also in Dukas, the plaintiff did not own the copyright to the copied
commercial. l at 307.
226. Thomson, 457 F. Supp. at 960.
227. The campaigns themselves might suggest that the enthusiasm, energy, and other
emotional content of the songs are a part of the message that the campaigns wish to take to the
people; by playing these songs, campaigns suggest to voters that it is desirable to become excited
and enthused about their candidate. This is somewhat incestuous reasoning. One of the very
purposes of any political campaign is to create excitement and enthusiasm for a candidate.
Nothing new is contributed to the discussion about a candidate by the use of a song.
A song containing a more explicit political message would seem to convey additional
protection on its user, by virtue of the fact that it makes a political statement. The "Live Free
or Die" song in Thomson illustrates this point - "Live Free or Die" was commissioned and used
by a political campaign and contained statements that one candidate wished to throw into the
public debate during the election by its use. The candidate can have little complaint when his
opponent took him up on this challenge by use of the same song.
228. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrolNAL LAw 1097-1121 and
1129-1132 (2d ed. 1988).
229. See supra notes 17-61 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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by the press, political pundits, and analysts. A campaign such as David
Duke's brings with it a tremendous amount of negative publicity,'
causing artists such as Bryan Adams to rightly fear association with such
negative exposure. 2 An artist should be able to dissociate himself from
such a candidate.
The legal system should not differentiate between David Duke and a
more "mainstream" candidate such as Bill Clinton or George Bush.
Therefore, similar claims by artists like Christine McVie or Bobby
McFerrin are as viable as those of Bryan Adams. Of course, an artist
should not immediately rush to the courthouse and sue. Rather, he should
first contact the offending campaign and request that it discontinue its use
of the song. 3 If offended by the political use of his work, an artist
should also make a public statement disassociating himself from the cam-
paign or its views.' It is not likely, especially if the artist acts prudently
and quickly in this fashion, that he will become negatively associated with
a campaign. Nevertheless, in spite of the probability that an artist will not
be associated with a candidate or his views, the artist should have a legal
right to control this kind of use of his work.
As demonstrated by the hypothetical cases, the artist would have a
strong claim of infringement of copyright," invasion of publicity
rightO6 and false endorsement, 7 should matters result in litigation.
There is no right without a remedy, and the artist stands an excellent
chance of prevailing on the merits and obtaining some form of relief. A
legal remedy may prove unsatisfactory and may not even make up the costs
of bringing the litigation." The actual pecuniary harm suffered by the
artist will likely be quite small. 9 The general public is able to readily
distinguish between a rock star singing a song and a politician staging a
rally.2' A campaign's use of a song will probably not affect the sales of
the song in the market at large and may in some cases help it. Therefore,
the damages suffered by an artist will most likely be de minimis, making
a legal remedy a poor economic choice for the plaintiff. The availability
231. See supra note 40.
232. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 47 and 61 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
of statutory damages of up to $100,000 for copyright infringement24'
mitigates this factor somewhat, but the fact that a campaign would likely
be bankrupt and that subsequent campaigns cannot pay the debts of defunct
campaigns means that money would probably never be seen by the
plaintiff.
242
A more appropriate and effective remedy is to seek a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the defendant campaign from using the song. Should
matters progress to this stage, an artist would have an excellent chance of
success. 3 While a defendant campaign could invoke a long string of
defenses, including fair use,244 statutory exceptions to copyright infringe-
ment,245 standing,246 and the First Amendment,247 the plaintiff would
likely prevail. A preliminary injunction would prevent the further use of
the songs by the campaign and would likely be in place for the remainder
of the campaign. It would quickly, effectively, and inexpensively
distinguish both the song and the artist from the political candidate with
whom the artist does not want to become associated. It also provides the
artist with an opportunity to appear in court and demonstrate that he does
not endorse the candidate in any fashion.
The negative publicity associated with such a lawsuit, regardless of
which party ultimately prevails, takes away the very coin a political
campaign exists to obtain: a good public image. If an artist asks that his
work not be used by a campaign, he should only need to threaten to sue.
No campaign, certainly at the presidential level, would want to allow this
kind of bad publicity to surround itself and taint its carefully-sculpted
public image of the candidate. A lawsuit also feeds a campaign's
opponents with ammunition to use against them in negative advertising.
The politically wise choice, given an artist who does not want a campaign
using his song, is to honor his wishes.
Erik Gunderson*
241. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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243. See supra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 214-228 and accompanying text.
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